©️ By Chinedu Agu
The elders say that when a man who has been sleeping throughout the market suddenly wakes up and begins to shout “thief,” reasonable people must first determine whether he is raising an alarm or merely talking from his sleep.
Yesterday night [Tuesday, 14 July 2026], I read that the Imo State House of Assembly reportedly passed a motion of “urgent public importance” condemning what it described as the continuous and unilateral extension of the tenure of Hon. Justice I. O. Agugua as Acting Chief Judge of Imo State by the National Judicial Council.
According to the House, the NJC’s action violates section 271(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, usurps the powers of the Governor and undermines the doctrine of separation of powers.
It is almost touching to see the Imo State House of Assembly rediscover section 271 of the Constitution with the zeal of an enthusiastic convert. After months of selective muteness, executive cheerleading and legislative contortions, the Assembly now moves a motion “condemning” the National Judicial Council for extending the acting appointment of the Acting Chief Judge. This is comical!
The trouble is not only that the Assembly’s outrage arrives late and theatrically, it is that the protest betrays a basic misunderstanding of the very provision it brandishes like a cudgel.
I read the report once. Then I read it again. I subsequently returned to section 271 to confirm whether the National Assembly had secretly amended the Constitution overnight and replaced the version known to lawyers and the public with the version apparently being circulated inside the Imo State House of Assembly. It had not.
The Constitution remains the same. It is the Imo lawmakers’ understanding of it that appears to have suffered an unfortunate amendment.
Section 271(4) provides:
“If the office of Chief Judge of a State is vacant or if the person holding the office is for any reason unable to perform the functions of the office, then until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of that office, or until the person holding the office has resumed those functions, the Governor of the State shall appoint the most senior Judge of the High Court to perform those functions.”
Section 271(5) then provides:
“Except on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council an appointment pursuant to subsection (4) of this section shall cease to have effect after the expiration of three months from the date of such appointment, and the Governor shall not reappoint a person whose appointment has lapsed.”
Put positively, the provision means:
Where the National Judicial Council recommends the continuation of an acting appointment made under section 271(4), that existing appointment may remain effective beyond the initial three months. Where there is no such recommendation, the appointment lapses after three months, and the Governor cannot reappoint the same person.
In simpler language, without the NJC’s recommendation, the acting appointment ends after three months, with the NJC’s recommendation, it does not end merely because the three months have expired. It continues.
The word “except” is decisive. It creates an exception to the general rule that an acting appointment expires after three months.
The provision does not state that the NJC must send its recommendation to the Governor so that the Governor may consider whether to accept it and thereafter make a fresh appointment. It does not say:
“The Governor may, on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, reappoint the Acting Chief Judge.” Had that been the intention, the Constitution could easily have used those words.
Indeed, section 271(1), dealing with the appointment of a substantive Chief Judge, expressly states that the appointment shall be made by the Governor on the recommendation of the NJC and subject to confirmation by the House of Assembly. By contrast, section 271(5) does not provide for another appointment by the Governor. It speaks about whether the existing appointment shall cease to have effect or shall continue. That difference in language is important.
Let us understand it as it should be: Under section 271(4), the Governor performs the act of appointment by appointing the most senior Judge of the High Court as Acting Chief Judge. After this initial appointment has been made, section 271(5) regulates its duration. The appointment ordinarily ends after three months, but the NJC may recommend its continuation. The legal effect of a timely NJC recommendation is therefore not to appoint the judge afresh, but to prevent the Governor’s existing appointment from lapsing at the end of the three-month period. The recommendation would naturally be communicated to the Governor because he made the original appointment and is the relevant executive authority.
However, communication to the Governor does not necessarily mean that the recommendation is submitted to him for a fresh discretionary decision. Section 271(5) does not say that the recommendation is subject to the Governor’s approval, nor does it empower him to accept or reject it according to his political preference.
The Governor’s appointment power has already been exercised under section 271(4). What section 271(5) supplies is the constitutional condition required for that appointment to remain effective beyond three months.
This interpretation is reinforced by the final words of the provision:
“The Governor shall not reappoint a person whose appointment has lapsed.” If the Constitution intended the NJC to recommend and the Governor thereafter to make another appointment every three months, it would not simultaneously prohibit the Governor from reappointing a person whose appointment has lapsed.
The more coherent interpretation is that the NJC must make its recommendation before the appointment lapses. Once that recommendation is made in time, the original appointment continues and there is no need for a fresh appointment, reappointment or another swearing-in by the Governor. If the appointment is allowed to lapse without an NJC recommendation, the Constitution expressly prevents the Governor from simply appointing the same person again.
Accordingly, when the NJC recommends that an Acting Chief Judge should continue for another three months, it is not appointing an Acting Chief Judge and is not usurping the Governor’s appointment power. It is exercising the separate constitutional function assigned to it under section 271(5).
To describe the NJC’s action as an “extension” is convenient administrative language.
More precisely, the NJC recommends continuation, and the constitutional effect of that recommendation is that the existing acting appointment does not cease after three months.
There is therefore no usurpation of the Governor’s power. The Governor made the appointment; the NJC merely performed the distinct role which the Constitution expressly assigned to it in determining whether that appointment may continue beyond its initial three-month life.
Unless a competent court eventually gives section 271(5) a different authoritative interpretation, this is the interpretation that most naturally gives meaning to every part of the provision without inserting words that the Constitution does not contain.
The Assembly is therefore condemning the NJC for performing the very constitutional function created to stop a Governor from treating the office of Acting Chief Judge as a renewable tenancy granted at his pleasure.
The latest continuation was communicated in a letter dated 30 June 2026 and was stated to operate from 26 June to 26 September 2026. However, the NJC had reportedly resolved at its 111th meeting of 13 May 2026 that, if the appointment of a substantive Chief Judge remained incomplete by 26 June, Justice Agugua’s acting tenure would continue for another three months. This decision therefore preceded the expiration date. At the same meeting, the NJC reportedly urged the Imo State Judicial Service Commission to expedite the process of appointing a substantive Chief Judge in order to promote stability, judicial independence and the effective administration of justice.
The NJC is therefore not seeking to keep Imo under an Acting Chief Judge indefinitely. It has called for the substantive process to be completed. The proper question is why the relevant institutions in Imo State have failed to conclude that process, thereby making further continuation necessary.
But answering that question would require the Assembly to look towards Government House and the Imo State Judicial Service Commission. Apparently, it is much safer for them to shout at Abuja than at Douglas House.
A little institutional memory is useful here, for it exposes both the House’s uncertain grasp of its constitutional responsibilities and the selective, often convenient manner in which it has performed them since its inauguration.
This is the House of Assembly that, in July 2024, constituted itself into an investigator of the then substantive Chief Judge of Imo State, Hon. Justice Theresa Chukwuemeka-Chikeka, adopted a finding of age falsification and recommended her removal to the Governor months before the NJC completed its own disciplinary process and recommended her compulsory retirement in November 2024.
This is the House that made no meaningful public outcry between 15 November 2024 and 1 April 2025 [approximately 5 months] when after Hon. Justice Chukwuemeka-Chikeka’s removal Imo State remained without an Acting Chief Judge.
This is the House that found no urgency when the Governor appointed Hon. Justice Theophilus Nzeukwu on 2 April 2025, the fourth most senior Judge of the Imo State High Court, instead of the most senior Judge, expressly required by section 271(4), which they now cite with ignorant glee.
This House that now waves section 271(4) like a newly discovered family inheritance did not condemn the appointment of number four when the Constitution plainly required number one. Its constitutional alarm remained mysteriously silent. Perhaps the batteries were flat then.
This is the House that never pressured the Governor to comply promptly with the NJC’s directive to reverse the appointment of Hon. Justice T.N. Nzeukwu as directed by NJC on 30 April 2025.
This is the House that still refused to ask the Governor to heed the directive of the NJC to appoint Hon. Justice Ijeoma Agugua after compulsorily retiring Hon. Justice Nzeukwu and reiterating that directive to appoint Hon. Justice Agugua on 26 June 2025.
This is the House of Assembly that made no whimper when it took the Governor 3 months to grudgingly obey the directive of the NJC by swearing-in Hon. Justice I.O. Agugua on 26 September 2025. It only discovered the gift of speech when speech became politically convenient.
This is the House that remained silent when the Governor constituted and inaugurated an Imo State Judicial Service Commission on 27 January and 31 January 2025, whose composition, in my view, violated the Constitution; a defect serious enough that I subsequently challenged the Commission’s legality before the court.
This is the House that watched Imo State remain without an Attorney-General from 26 May 2025 after the dismissal of Chief Sir. C.O.C. Akaolisa, until 26 September 2025 [4 months] when a new Attorney-General was eventually sworn-in.
This is the House that remained perfectly calm when, in 2024, the Governor announced himself interim Commissioner for Lands, Survey and Physical Planning. They did not understand the principle of separation of powers then.
Since nearly three years now, lawyers, property owners and members of the public have continued to complain about difficulties in conducting searches and obtaining services from the Ministry of Lands. Yet the Assembly still finds no emergency.
This is the House that has watched the Governor place the governance of Imo State on autopilot while he appears to monitor the aircraft from Abuja, only breezing into the State every so often to change its oil before flying off again.
This is the House that usurped the constitutional function of the Owerri Municipal Council provided in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution by renaming Douglas Road “Hope Uzodimma Road.” It could not identify the constitutional boundary between the State Legislature and a local government council when the purpose was to glorify the Governor.
Today, the same Assembly preaches separation of powers to the NJC. Indeed, hypocrisy becomes most entertaining when it wears a lawyer’s wig.
This is the House that has not raised its voice over the widely reported allegations of extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, forced labour, abuse, unlawful detention, organ harvesting, child trafficking, torture, extortion and impunity associated with the Anti-Kidnapping Unit of the Imo State Police Command, popularly called Tiger Base. When citizens allegedly cry from detention, the House whispers. When Government House frowns at the NJC, the House acquires a megaphone.
This is also the Assembly that watched as, during the court vacation between August and September 2025, the Compliance and Monitoring Unit attached to the Office of the Governor reportedly demolished people’s houses, shops and businesses without court orders. The demolitions have allegedly continued in different forms. The House did not and has not intervened meaningfully. Yet it has now become deeply troubled by the NJC’s reliance on section 271(5).
This is not legislative oversight, but legislative laryngitis that only flares up when the master coughs.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Imo State House of Assembly is entitled to criticise the prolonged delay in appointing a substantive Chief Judge. It may call upon the NJC, the Governor and the Judicial Service Commission to conclude the process promptly. It may debate whether prolonged acting arrangements are institutionally desirable. It may even approach a competent court for an authoritative interpretation if it genuinely believes the NJC has exceeded its powers. What it cannot responsibly do is misrepresent the plain language of section 271(5).
A serious legislature would ask why the appointment of a substantive Chief Judge remains incomplete, what steps the Judicial Service Commission has taken, what is delaying a constitutionally valid recommendation and whether political interests are attempting to influence the process.
Those are legitimate questions. But asking them would require genuine oversight, institutional courage and a willingness to scrutinise the Executive.
The Imo State House of Assembly should withdraw its embarrassing resolution and direct its energy towards ensuring that the Judicial Service Commission concludes a credible process for appointing a substantive Chief Judge.
The Igbo say that when a child carries a basket of eggs carelessly, it is not the ground that should be blamed when the eggs break.
The NJC did not create the prolonged acting tenure. The inability or unwillingness of the relevant institutions in Imo State to conclude the substantive appointment process created it.
Imo does not need a legislature that wakes only when the Governor’s political interests require noise. It needs a legislature that knows the law, respects the Constitution and possesses enough independence to apply both consistently.
Until then, every motion of “urgent public importance” will continue to raise one genuinely urgent public question: What kind of law can lawmakers who do not know the law possibly make?
Chinedu Agu
Solicitor and Notary Public | Past Secretary, NBA Owerri | Activist | FPD
ezeomeaku@gmail.com
15 July 2026
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